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In her book Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Martha Minow 
begins a chapter on reparations with a brief discussion of restorative 
justice. She characterizes restorative justice as seeking “repair of 
social connections and peace rather than retribution against 
offenders;” she describes it as “building connections and enhancing 
communication between perpetrators and those they victimized, and 
forging ties across the community...”1 Later in the same chapter, 
however, when talking about monetary reparations Minow says the 
“core idea” behind reparations is compensatory justice, the view that 
“wrongdoers should pay victims for losses” to wipe the slate clean.2 
Several recent discussions of reparations for historical injustice 
and mass political violence reject the idea that compensatory or, as I 
will call it, corrective justice is the relevant or primary category for 
reparations involving groups or large numbers of individual victims of 
injustice.3 Roy Brooks considers the “tort model” of pursuing 
compensation from institutions and private parties through legal action 
a secondary, morally deficient and relatively unpromising avenue. He 
advances an “atonement model” of reparations premised on “the post-
Holocaust vision of heightened morality, victim-perpetrator identity, 
egalitarianism, and restorative justice.”4 Although Brooks does not 
define restorative justice, his account of atonement makes apology 
central and sees monetary and other reparations as necessary to make 
apologies believable. Janna Thompson situates her argument for 
historical obligations to repair past wrongs, such as the theft of lands 
from indigenous people or the injustice of slavery, in a conception of 
“reparation as reconciliation” in contrast to a “legalistic” one of 
“reparation as restoration.” The aim of reparations on this view is “to 
repair relations damaged by injustice–not to return to a state of affairs 
that existed before the injustice was done.”5 
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Ruti Teitel, in her extensive study of transitional justice practice, finds 
that “reparatory practices have become the leading response in the 
contemporary wave of political transformation,” but that reparatory 
practices in political transition “defy categorization as either criminal or 
corrective justice” by both redressing individual rights violations and 
signifying responsibility for criminal wrongdoing.6 Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
appeals to “a basic maxim of law that harms should be remedied” in a 
discussion of reparations for mass violence, but argues that individual 
court-ordered reparations are both impractical in cases where there 
are many victims and inadequate to address collective elements of 
harm in situations of mass conflict or repression where communities 
are targeted for violence and are sometimes made complicit in 
atrocities.7 She advocates collective reparations, like community 
development, community participatory adjudication or preferential 
access to services, while recognizing that such collective measures 
may fail adequately to address or protect victims of political violence. 
Discussing cases of mass violence and repression, Pablo de Greiff 
makes the most extensive and pointed argument against a “juridical” 
approach to reparations that aims to re-establish the status quo ante 
by proportionate compensation for harms. Compensating for harms on 
this legalistic conception entails problems of quantification and 
generalization of harms, as well as interpersonal comparisons of 
suffering, creating divisive hierarchies of victims and clouding the 
relationship of reparations programs to other justice measures. He 
proposes an expressly “political” conception of reparations programs 
that measures their effectiveness in terms of social justice; reparations 
programs should express and create conditions for recognition, civic 
trust, and social solidarity between victims and others in societies 
undergoing political transition.8 
The field of application for reparations is broad, comprising 
cases where wrongs are discretely episodic and the concrete means of 
repair (for example, monetary compensation) are fairly 
straightforward, cases of gross and murderous violation of massive 
numbers of human beings during a specific period of political 
repression or persecution, and group histories of destruction, 
dispossession, subjugation and degradation of status that span 
centuries. The nature and background of particular cases of injury, as 
well as the foreground of current social relationships and practical 
political possibilities, matter decisively for how injury and responsibility 
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are apt to be understood, and what measures of repair are apt to be 
available and meaningful. I do not wish to deny that what many 
writers call a “legalistic” or “juridical” understanding of reparations–
basically, reparation as an exercise of corrective justice–might be 
usefully applied in some cases. Nor do I attempt to draw a single line 
of demarcation between cases where corrective justice will serve 
adequately as a model for reparation and those to which it is wholly 
inapt. I propose to explore an alternative to corrective justice as a 
framework for reparations in certain kinds of cases. 
Although there is no consensus on even a formal 
characterization of corrective justice, conceptions of corrective justice 
as a moral ideal suppose a moral baseline of acceptable conduct or 
due care and regard for the security, dignity or well-being of others. 
Corrective justice demands “correction” of what are presumed to be 
discrete lapses from that prior or standing moral baseline in particular 
interpersonal or institutional transactions with individuals, or 
unacceptable impacts of the action or omission of some individuals 
upon others.9 For this reason, corrective justice may be at least 
artificial and perhaps incoherent in addressing histories, acts or forms 
of injustice that consists in radical denial of moral standing or in 
relentless enforcement of degraded moral status of individuals, 
especially when these are systemic conditions and persist over 
extended periods of time. Conditions of moral exclusion and 
degradation, typically embodied either in legal exclusion from certain 
standings, the absence of political rights or the enforcement of 
diminished political and civil status, are invariably based on group 
membership defined either by putatively natural or elective attributes 
(race, gender, ethnicity, religious creed, disability, sexuality) or by 
proscribed political activity or membership. These conditions may 
endure for centuries (histories of dispossession and cultural and 
physical destruction visited on indigenous people by European 
colonization) or be relatively transient (political persecutions under 
particular regimes). 
The “problem of the baseline” is not adequately comprehended 
by corrective justice. Rather, I will argue, it is the construction of 
morally adequate relations in and through the establishment of 
defensible and shared moral baselines that is a requirement of justice 
in certain cases, along with reparation for the manifold effects of the 
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absence or unacceptability of such baselines and the usually repetitive 
failure to recognize, admit, or correct. Restorative justice, I will argue, 
is a more adequate framing ideal for reparative practice where there is 
a need to establish a governing understanding of “right relationship” 
and to approach its realization, rather than to intervene episodically to 
correct deviations from an existing standard. I will explore some ways 
that restorative justice is more instructive concerning what injuries of 
denial and degradation involve, and so what it means to address and 
redress them, as well as whose responsibility it might be to do so. I 
will argue that restorative justice accommodates and perhaps requires 
bottom-up and incremental attempts at repair as a social and political 
process, a process that may be signified but is not exhausted by a 
particular reparations program or reparative gesture like a public 
apology. I identify six core values of restorative justice and explain its 
guiding aim of “restoring relationships.” I examine a distinctive 
orientation within restorative justice to compensation as one among 
many means to repair, to articulating wrongs and harms fully, to 
processes that “leverage” responsibility, and to the active role of 
communities of varying types in doing justice. The case I address 
briefly in conclusion is that of African-American reparations. 
 
Corrective Justice and the Moral Baseline 
Critics of a corrective justice model of reparations – whether 
they call it “legalistic,” “compensatory,” “juridical,” or “reparatory” – 
find conceptual, practical, political and moral grounds for criticism. 
Conceptually, it is fair to say, as de Greiff does, that corrective justice 
tends to focus on mechanisms of restitution or compensation and to 
emphasize some representative relationship, usually “proportionality,” 
between compensation and injury. It is not easy to pry corrective 
justice thinking away from legal paradigms of compensating for undue 
loss and injury, although often compensation in political or historical 
cases is apt to be, and perhaps in the interests of political feasibility 
and social solidarity must be, symbolic. Practically, dealing with 
compensation for very large numbers of victims of political violence or 
oppression poses financial burdens and political snares in many 
transitional contexts where reparations compete for limited resources. 
Administrative arrangements for implementing reparations 
mechanisms can become costly, divisive and demoralizing if they are 
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too fine-grained in vetting eligibility. In some cases, like histories of 
chattel slavery, sexual enslavement or genocide, the meaning of 
compensation is powerfully shaped by the larger frame: other gestures 
of recognition, acknowledgment, atonement, memorializing, social 
support and guarantees of prevention determine whether financial 
compensation sends an acceptable and dignifying message to victims 
and perpetrators, as well as to society generally. It may often be these 
other nonmonetary measures that are possible, valuable, and 
necessary, whether or not monetary compensation is likely or wise. 
Reparations policies must be politically feasible, but neither can they 
appear as cheap buy-outs or fail to address victims directly and to 
validate their experience of suffering and specific experience of 
injustice, lest they add further moral insult to moral and material 
injury. The balance of individual and collective reparative measures, 
and delicate matters of fit among monetary, service, and rehabilitation 
packages and more symbolic gestures, can seem to outstrip the rather 
basic idea of a “give back” that has dominated corrective justice 
thinking since Aristotle. These problems are real and pressing but they 
might be understood as symptoms of a deeper issue. The framework 
of corrective justice strains, because it has never been meant to deal 
with either a massive scale of serious mayhem or a protracted and 
brutal subjugation and mutually ramifying indignities and atrocities 
that characterize oppressive and violently repressive systems. But 
what is the “framework of corrective justice”? 
There is no canonical formal characterization of the kind of 
justice that sets right wrongful or undue losses and injuries any more 
than there is a single accepted terminology. Some writers emphasize a 
right to reasonable security from undue losses imposed even by 
others’ nonculpable acts while others delimit the occasions for 
corrective justice to cases of wrongdoing or the violation of rights.10 
Some see corrective justice as a remedial mechanism to restore just 
distributions, while others see corrective justice as more autonomous 
and directed to maintaining a basis for stable expectations that 
facilitate social cooperation in various interactions, at least to some 
extent independently of the justice of underlying distributions.11 A 
common function of corrective justice in numerous accounts, however, 
is that there is a standard of moral acceptability for the impact we 
have on each other through our actions and interactions, and that 
corrective justice responds to correct those impacts of action and 
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interaction that fall outside of that standard of moral acceptability, 
however it is characterized. This is the standard I call the moral 
baseline, and it may be set in terms of just distribution, a kind of right 
or rights, a norm of fairness, standards of due care and attentiveness, 
or the dignity and respect-worthiness of persons. 
Unsurprisingly, contemporary authors are inclined to 
characterize the moral baseline of corrective justice in the language of 
moral equality. Gerald Gaus describes compensatory justice as aiming 
at restoration of “moral equality.”12 Bernard Boxill’s early piece on 
black reparations sees justice as requiring equal consideration between 
equals, and so an acknowledgment of the error of treatment that fails 
to respect equality and a reaffirmation of belief in equality of the 
injured party.13 It seems possible, however, for corrective justice to 
function as a principle in societies with differentiated and even 
hierarchically organized statuses with reciprocal but not symmetrical 
obligations and responsibilities; there, too, there will be due and 
undue treatment and recognition, and so a need for redressing 
interactions and impacts that deprive some parties of what they 
rightfully claim. Hammurabi’s laws, for example, include many specific 
rules not only for punishing prohibited acts but also for correcting 
transactions involving slaves and masters, husbands and wives, 
parents and children, who are not supposed to enjoy equality of status 
in the modern sense. 
There is, then, a duality within corrective justice. Its moral 
function might be described as defining and preserving reciprocity and 
responsibility between individuals (or groups) for their actions and 
impacts on each other in certain respects (identified by particular 
norms) in a social order defining proper places and allowing stable 
interpersonal expectations.14 Yet the norms that set the baselines for 
acceptable treatment and due care and attention that give corrective 
justice its specific content – what actions or impacts it is a requirement 
of justice to correct, and what reparative actions will constitute 
correction – may themselves be morally indefensible; at the extreme, 
an assumption of reciprocity may be absent. When norms define 
unequal statuses based on bogus forms of innate superiority, 
fabricated natural hierarchies of authority or natural divisions of talent 
and interest, or when they opportunistically deny rights or effective 
protection and remedies to powerless, despised or stigmatized groups, 
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then indefensible moral baselines of corrective justice, or the absence 
of moral baselines with respect to members of some despised group, 
becomes part of that for which justice requires a remedy. Corrective 
justice is only as morally legitimate as the baselines it treats as 
morally compelling. The legitimacy of baselines becomes an issue in 
cases of gross or systemic mistreatment or deprivation of rights 
characteristic of oppressive social structures and, in somewhat 
different ways, in political episodes where states, often with some legal 
basis (“emergency powers”), terrorize or mistreat segments of their 
own population. Societies over time may come to adopt more 
justifiable baselines that move toward more uniform recognition of 
equal worth and dignity of all members. This recognition of equal 
dignity sets the stage for addressing the problem of faulty baselines 
that both license unjust treatment and are a cause of it. It does not, 
however, solve this problem, although measures that acknowledge 
precisely that situation we might expect to be part of what corrective 
justice demands. 
Corrective justice uses its moral baseline to identify and attach 
obligations of repair to faulty performance under the standards, not to 
faulty standards. Furthermore, corrective justice, if it is to be a basis 
for reparations, requires principles that can span cultural and national 
communities. While international and humanitarian law and evolving 
best practices purport to set a universal standard of moral equality, it 
is an aspirational standard that does not and in many instances cannot 
define stable expectations for those whose more local communities 
and cultures, legal and social, play by very different rules. Thus, the 
framework of corrective justice seems to predicate the normal 
operation of legitimate standards of conduct and impact in order to 
secure performance or repair for failure in, or untoward outcomes due 
to, the performance of actors. It is not accidental that one analysis 
that clearly identifies the problem of the baseline is Andrew Sharp’s 
study of the search for justice between Maori and Pakeha people of 
New Zealand. Sharp adopts a legalistic conception of restitution and 
compensation, but incorporates not only the idea of “reciprocal 
exchange between two equal parties” in his definition of reparative 
justice, but also the proviso that the parties recognize “the same 
standards of right.”15 Sharp’s focus on justice claims in an 
intercultural, historical and post-colonization context brings the 
problem of a shared baseline to the fore. It is also one reason for 
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Sharp’s sobering conclusion that “in conditions of biculturalism, strict 
justice is actually impossible.”16 
Strict justice may well be impossible in any case of gross 
violence or systemic degradation, yet the question of how best to 
conceive the measure of justice remains. Discussions of reparation 
continue to invoke the ideal of corrective (or compensatory or 
reparative) justice, which in turn is pulled inevitably toward legal 
models of responsibility to compensate for wrongful harm. The basic 
idea of “compensating” for harm is stretched in various practical, 
symbolic or moral directions, or is assimilated to the compensatory 
framework by referring to the “remedies” and “satisfaction” due to 
victims of serious wrong, staying with the fundamental idea of “giving 
back” in order to set right.17 Given the limitations of the framework of 
corrective justice, I explore the potential of another, less 
philosophically familiar picture of justice. 
 
Restorative Justice: A Conception and its Values 
Restorative justice is not yet part of the shared philosophical 
language of justice theory. Nor does restorative justice sit easily with 
the priority of “ideal theory” that has controlled much thinking about 
justice in the late twentieth century. Ideal theory was identified by 
Rawls as the necessary starting point of justice theory. Ideal theory 
assumes a “well-ordered society” in which “everyone is presumed to 
act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”18 Within the 
Rawlsian framework compensatory justice is essentially part of “partial 
compliance theory” that deals with injustice. Restorative justice begins 
from and defines itself in terms of the reality of violation, alienation, 
and disregard among human beings. Its central concept of “restoring 
relationships” supposes that it is disregard or violation of acceptable 
human relationships that stands at the core of its agenda, practically 
and philosophically. 
Restorative justice was introduced to many for the first time 
when it was invoked as the guiding conception of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.19 The theory and practice of 
restorative justice, however, began two decades earlier in criminal 
justice applications with experiments such as victim-offender 
mediation programs and forms of family or community conferences. I 
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suggest that six central restorative justice values repeat throughout an 
extensive and growing literature.20 
1. Restorative justice aims above all to repair the harm 
caused by wrong, crime, and violence. 
2. Restorative justice makes central the experiences and 
needs (material, emotional, and moral) of victims. 
3. Restorative justice insists on genuine accountability 
and responsibility-taking from those who are responsible 
for harm, ideally directly to those who have suffered the 
harm. 
4. Restorative justice seeks to return ownership of the 
resolution of wrong, crime, and harm to those primarily 
affected and those who can in turn effect meaningful 
repair: to those who have done wrong or are responsible 
for harm, to victims, to immediate communities of care 
of victims and offenders, and to larger affected or 
interested communities. 
5. Restorative justice aims at offering those responsible 
for wrong and harm the opportunity through 
accountability and repair to earn self-respect and to be 
reintegrated without stigma into their communities. 
6. Restorative justice seeks to build and strengthen 
individuals’ and communities’ capacities to do justice 
actively, and not to surrender the role of doing justice to 
experts, professionals, or “the state,” which should play 
facilitating roles. 
These core values serve the ultimate aim and guiding norm of 
restorative justice, “restoring relationships.” In restorative justice what 
demands repair is a state of relationship between a victim and 
wrongdoer, and among each and his or her community that has been 
distorted, damaged or destroyed. Serious harm to individuals creates a 
relationship charged with powerful negative feelings and burdened 
with losses that can continue to mar a victim’s life. Restorative justice 
targets a situation of negative connection or disconnection that might 
be an ongoing source of threat, insult, anger, fear, and grief.21 It is not 
always possible, nor is it always desirable, to restore relationship 
between those who have done or allowed harm and those who have 
suffered at their hands or by their indifference or carelessness. In 
some cases where restoration between victims and offending persons 
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is possible it can nevertheless mean only a wary coexistence. In any 
case, however, it is necessary to attempt to restore morally habitable 
conditions for those wronged within their supporting network of 
relationships and in their communities. At a minimum, others must 
acknowledge the wrong and harm done to victims and accept the 
legitimacy of victims’ demands for recognition and redress. Where 
some bear responsibility (in any of several ways) for the wrong done 
to others, apology, combining acknowledgment of wrong, 
responsibility for wrong and repudiation of wrong, is in order.22 
Resentment of victims’ claims to repair, victim-blaming or indifference 
to a victim’s violation and suffering is the antithesis of restoration: it 
tells the victim that the wrong is denied or that he or she does not 
matter. 
The terminology of “restoration” is sometimes criticized because 
it implies return to a condition of relationship that either did not exist 
or was unacceptable.23 I propose that we understand “restoration” in 
all contexts as normative: “restoration” refers to repairs that move 
relationships in the direction of becoming morally adequate, without 
assuming a morally adequate status quo ante. Morally adequate 
relations are ones in which three conditions obtain. In them, people 
are confident that they share some basic standards for the treatment 
of each other. People are able to trust each other to abide by those 
standards or at least to acknowledge fault if they (or others) do not 
abide by them. And so, finally, people are entitled to be hopeful that 
unacceptable treatment will not prevail, that unacceptable behavior 
will not be defended or ignored where it occurs, and that victims will 
not be abandoned in their reliance on our shared commitment to our 
standards and to each other.24 
The ideal of restorative justice is that its values should be 
expressed both in the structure of processes of dealing with violence 
and injustice and in the outcomes of doing so. Paradigmatic restorative 
justices practices, such as victim-offender dialogue, group 
conferences, truth commissions, or apologies (personal or public), not 
only aim at adequate forms of relationship as an outcome but require 
participants to act out the morally adequate relationships at which 
they aim. The practices involve responsive and respectful forms of 
encounter, interaction, and expression, such as offenders directly 
facing and hearing victims; victims being able to confront offenders 
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and to seek information directly from offenders about what happened 
and why they were targeted, information that is often critical to 
victims’ own understanding, peace of mind, and sense of 
blamelessness. Offenders, too, are able to represent themselves, and 
in doing so may be able to represent their own human vulnerabilities 
and their regret or shame as well as their willingness to apologize and 
make amends, affirming their competence and self-respect as moral 
agents. In some formats other participants encourage more honest, 
responsive, and responsible interaction between victim and offender, 
and they can exert pressure as well as provide support for plans of 
restitution, compensation, or service that aim at repair. 
A corrective justice framework tends to make compensation – 
making good a victim’s loss – central, with pressures toward defining a 
metric of loss and, ideally, compensation in some proportion to loss. 
There are familiar challenges for this approach, including the obscurity 
of counterfactual claims about what victims “would have” had, and 
puzzles about how much of what they might have had they now 
deserve to receive.25 Many serious harms and injustices, such as the 
murder of a loved one or the expropriation of a people’s land and 
destruction of their language and culture due to genocidal practices of 
colonization, create losses that are not literally compensable at all. 
Restorative justice, too, emphasizes material and practical amends 
that address victims’ losses and needs, but restitution and 
compensation in a restorative framework play instrumental and 
symbolic roles in repairing relationships, including the role of adding 
weight to expressive interpersonal gestures such as apology and 
expressions of sorrow, shame, guilt or desire to relieve the victims’ 
pain and anger. The direct concern of restorative justice is the moral 
quality of future relations between those who have done, allowed, or 
benefitted from wrong and those harmed, deprived or insulted by it. In 
some cases compensation or restitution will be indispensable to signify 
full recognition, respect and concern to victims. In other contexts 
material reparation might be unnecessary, and in no cases is it, by 
itself, sufficient for signaling appropriate moral regard. Compensation 
by itself need not signal responsibility for injury, much less regret or 
atonement by those responsible. Without a surrounding framework of 
respectful acknowledgment, responsibility and concern, compensation 
can take on insulting, condescending or dismissive meanings. The 
nature and meaning of restitution or compensation in restorative 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Social Philosphy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 2006): pg. 377-395. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
12 
 
justice should emerge from a practice of communication centered on 
the needs and understandings of victims as well as wrongdoers’ 
deepened understanding of the nature and meaning of the victims’ loss 
and of the nature and extent of their own responsibility. 
A second difference between restorative justice and corrective 
justice approaches concerns the common phenomenon of denial, 
evasion, or minimizing of responsibility by those implicated in 
wrongdoing. Corrective justice, like retributive justice, requires that 
responsibility of particular parties be established in order to determine 
who must or should “pay” for wrong, through punishment or 
compensation. Ironically, this almost guarantees that the “bigger” the 
injustice the more contested will be the antecedent premises of 
responsibility. The more massive, collectively supported or tolerated, 
or historically extended an injustice is, the easier it will be to argue 
that assignments of responsibility are unclear, incoherent or unfair, 
and so that arguments for large-scale redress cannot get started, or 
measures of redress are narrowly targeted to a few parties. 
Restorative justice practices by contrast typically create the conditions 
to leverage responsibility, that is, to move people from a minimal or 
peripheral sense of connection and responsibility to a richer and more 
demanding perception of what harms the wrong does and how they 
might be related to it. 
In restorative justice practices that address ordinary crime, such 
as victim-offender mediation, conferences, or peacemaking circles, 
once offenders and other responsible or concerned parties are willing 
to engage in restorative justice practice, it is common for this 
movement toward greater and broader acceptance of responsibility to 
occur. Those who have already assumed some responsibility come to a 
deepened sense of the reality, extent and consequences of what they 
have done to another human being. It is also common for others 
concerned, such as families or communities, to begin to see 
themselves as implicated, either by connections they have not before 
examined or admitted, or by a realization that they can make a 
difference by contributing to or assisting with some form of repair. 
Victims along with others may want to take an active role in the 
restorative outcome or in a continuing process of repair. Restorative 
practice is thus dynamic with respect to responsibility. It may not be 
necessary to establish responsibility extensively, exclusively or 
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certainly in order to engage in restorative justice; restorative justice 
practice may be the a way to discover, induce, deepen, extend, and 
clarify responsibilities that are unnoticed, resisted or denied at the 
outset of a process, or have been reassuringly assigned to some small 
number of target individuals. Institutional, governmental, and 
community exercises in restorative justice, including projects of finding 
and telling truths, create the opportunity and the medium for apparent 
responsibilities to be acknowledged , but also for additional 
responsibilities, both backward and forward looking, to be discerned 
and accepted.26 
A third feature of restorative justice lies in its fostering a full 
exploration of the nature and impact of the wrong and of the rupture 
in relationship that explains it or results from it. Communicative 
interaction and voice for victims, whether in the form of a face to face 
conference or in the form of an official truth process after political 
violence, aims to create an adequate description of the wrong which is 
essential to assessing the requirements of repair. Trudy Govier points 
to research that shows a substantial “magnitude gap” between victims 
and perpetrators (and sometimes, we might note, between either and 
third parties) in evaluating the seriousness of harms.27 As injustices 
grow in magnitude, violence, and historical duration the reality, 
nature, intent and seriousness of violations becomes predictably 
contested, and the need for a careful and detailed articulation of the 
full story of violence, oppression, terror or subjugation becomes both a 
reparative activity and a measure of the adequacy of other measures 
of repair. 
Finally, restorative justice makes communities of varying sizes 
and descriptions central in several ways. Communities may be 
harmed, materially and morally, by wrongs to their members and to 
their resources, including their moral resources of trust and 
hopefulness. Communities can also serve as actors or as guarantors of 
repair and restoration of relationships. When individuals primarily 
responsible for wrongs and harms are unavailable or are unwilling to 
accept responsibility and to seek to redress their wrongs, restoration 
may devolve to communities or networks within communities. Indeed, 
the emphasis in restorative justice on catalyzing and strengthening the 
capacity of individuals and communities to do justice in the wake of 
wrongdoing suggests that official actors in the legal system or 
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government are by no means the only actors and should not always be 
the principal actors in attempting to bring justice to bear. Restorative 
justice encourages “bottom-up” efforts at justice, while not excluding 
official roles or responsibilities. Restorative justice supports not a zero-
sum but a “both-and” approach to responsibility for restoration of 
relations. 
The idea of “community” is used very flexibly in restorative 
justice, but there is a practical basis for allowing the identification of 
the relevant community in context. The harmed community and the 
community that can effectively respond to support repair need not be 
the same collectivity. It might be that neither community possesses an 
organizational structure and executive function to undertake actions 
corporately and representatively; the relevant collectivities might be 
relatively unstructured or informal, like a locality or neighborhood. The 
community that can effectively respond need not do so, or even be 
able to do so, corporately; it might be that its members or some 
groups of members act out of it, or on its behalf, or in its name. And 
there might also be multiple responsible communities, some 
institutionally embodied and represented, and others not, that can and 
should play roles in addressing and redressing injustice. In some 
restorative justices practices in the criminal context, like forms of 
conferencing or peacemaking circles, the community or communities 
can encompass individuals and groups that see themselves as harmed 
by the crime, others that have reason for concern, and others still who 
are potential sources of support and guarantee of plans for repair in 
which they themselves might or might not participate. In a restorative 
justice perspective, communities that matter can be multiple and 
differently situated with respect to a crime or injustice. Relevant 
communities might not be given in advance but rather formed in 
response to the demands of doing justice in the wake of specific 
wrongs.28 
 
Black Redress and a Restorative Justice 
Perspective 
I want to illustrate very briefly the productive nature of a 
restorative justice perspective for one kind of case where a shared 
moral baseline has never been firmly and reliably in effect. The case is 
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the failure of “black redress,” to use Roy Brooks’s succinct phrase for 
the need in the United States to address and redress several hundred 
years of enslavement, legal subjugation and exclusion and legally 
tolerated exposure to violence extending from the seventeenth to the 
mid-twentieth century. This history of injustice arguably continues 
today in society’s acquiescence in persisting and repeatedly 
documented inequalities of wealth, health, freedom, civic respect and 
life-prospects for African-Americans, and in widespread resistance to 
and resentment of the topic of reparations for slavery and its sequels 
in the general – majority white – public. I do not undertake here to 
repeat the history of cruel and profound injustice punctuated by 
opportunities and failures to repair that others have ably provided.29 
What I add here is that restorative justice identifies the problem and 
the path to reparation in a way better suited to this kind of case than 
does the corrective model. 
Restorative justice targets the damage or distortion in 
relationship that is both a cause and an effect of wrongs. A problem 
that lies at the heart of the continuous and continuing sequence of 
enslavement, legal subjugation and persisting exposure to violence, 
discrimination and neglect of enslaved Africans in America and African-
American citizens is the profound distortion of relationship, socially and 
emotionally, between the still rigid and polarized raced groups, “black” 
and “white,” that are constituted by this very distortion. A deep and 
unexamined contempt of whites for blacks is the most salient and 
disturbing symptom of the distortion. The attitude of contempt ranges 
from the benign contempt of indifference to the history, current 
condition and future of African-Americans to the angry contempt of 
defensive hostility and overt racism of many whites toward blacks, 
especially when asked to pay attention to the history or present 
conditions of injustice. Focusing on white attitudes to blacks, however, 
is both incomplete and deceptive; the legacy of race and white 
supremacist racism also decisively shapes the self-understanding of 
whites. The contempt of indifference allows whites not to feel that they 
are part of an urgent present problem and allows whites to be ill-
informed and uncurious, or complacently but often mistakenly 
confident, in what they know about the history and legacies of racial 
oppression. It allows whites to think of the history of race in America 
as something that happened to African-Americans and not what 
happened to whites. Part of the self-understanding of whites, as 
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decades of critical race theory reveals, is not to know what whiteness 
means; to think that race and racial oppression has to do with blacks 
and other non-white people; and to feel right-minded in condemning 
unconscionable things that were done to African-Americans “long ago,” 
even though legally enforced segregation is within the memory of 
many living individuals who have never received reparation.30 For 
African-Americans, the basis for earned trust in whites is lacking; 
worse, its emergence is undermined by continuing evidence of racism 
and the persistence of the denial or minimization of the reality of 
racism still common in white America, as well as indifference or 
hostility to appeals for reparation that reappear punctually throughout 
American history from slavery times.31 Deeper lies the assault on the 
hopefulness of many African-Americans who face reduced life chances 
and the reality that their children may for another generation contend 
with the insults and obstacles of racism, and the results of poverty, 
poor education, crime and incarceration, that others blithely ignore or 
deny.32 
A telling symptom of a disconnected, evasive or hostile attitude 
of white Americans to the unredressed history of injustice to African-
Americans is reported opposition among white Americans toward a 
U.S. government apology for slavery or that larger history. Polls 
continue to show heavy white opposition to – and black support for – 
an official national apology for slavery.33 Apology is the most minimal 
but unambiguous and foundational gesture of repair. Not to apologize 
is to fail to accept, and refusal to apologize is to deny, the fact of the 
wrong, the seriousness of the wrong, responsibility for the wrong, 
repudiation of the wrong, or all of these.34 Official apologies, 
furthermore, not only acknowledge and accept responsibility for a past 
wrong, but typically serve to signal a recognized need to re-establish 
institutional moral credibility, an intent to establish a certain version of 
events as the official story, and a public resolve to accept a correct 
moral standard for future conduct.35 To resist an official apology 
reveals opposition to this definitive public correction of course. Another 
dimension of apology, often crucial to its effect but not always 
adequately noted, is the empathetic function of apology. Apologies are 
often inadequate or disappointing to the one harmed if they do not 
manage to convey appreciation of the suffering, anger, mistrust or 
grief the victim experiences as a result of the wrong.36 To refuse 
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apology can mean refusing to acknowledge that these universal human 
responses to injury and disrespect are fitting. 
There are compelling arguments for responsibility of the U.S. 
government as a continuing institution that bears responsibility for its 
roles in accepting and protecting slavery and then in legitimating the 
degraded Jim Crow citizenship that currently living individuals and 
communities have endured.37 I agree that the federal government is 
an appropriate and important locus of responsibility for apology and 
further reparative measures. Yet restorative justice, while not rejecting 
the importance of moral responsibilities of government, offers a 
distinctive perspective: justice is done both in and by restoring moral 
relationship and so affirming, perhaps for the first time, a truly shared 
moral baseline of reciprocal responsibility and equal dignity. 
Governmental actions alone are not adequate to that task, and 
government action on more local – state and municipal – levels might 
represent in a more immediate way communities with which people 
identify, especially if those communities address their own local 
histories of racial violence, exploitation or exclusion. Institutions like 
corporations, churches and universities are other localities for the 
identification and exploration of unredressed racial wrongs. 
At the same time, the “restoration of relationship” sought within 
restorative justice terms, pursued on local levels by governmental, 
institutional and civic initiatives, could create better conditions for the 
pursuit of national reparations, material and symbolic, for African-
Americans. Putting a priority on historical inquiry, dialogue and voice 
of those concerned or affected, and inviting active engagement in the 
present with the past, opens opportunities that restorative justice 
distinctively seeks. There can be fuller articulation of wrongs, 
discovery of their consequences and space for acknowledgment of 
responsibilities of various kinds, including past involvement or 
acquiescence in unacceptable practices, recognition of benefits from 
racial inequality, irresponsible or defensive ignorance of facts, or the 
ability to contribute to changing the future. Legacies of racial violence 
and oppression will predictably have affected African-Americans in 
immediate ways (including incidents of violence and victimization that 
may have remained unknown in families and communities) but may 
also have affected whites and other racial minorities negatively. Past 
cooperative efforts across racial lines might also come into focus 
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alongside practices that used race to stigmatize and humiliate citizens. 
Local initiatives can explore forms of reparation – memorials, 
celebrations, history projects, museums, educational programs, 
genealogy projects, public art, dramatic performance, and others – 
that meaningfully address the nature of wrongs and moments of 
constructive change in particular communities whose identities and 
boundaries might be reconfigured by such initiatives. 
Conclusion: Untangling Relations and Incubating 
Reparations 
I have described restorative justice as an approach to 
reparations that could be adopted, but I was prompted to think about 
the restorative justice and reparations by reflecting on an actual surge 
in local initiatives to deal with unredressed racial injustice and violence 
against African-Americans in the past ten to fifteen years. 
The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, America’s 
first self-named truth commission, is a privately financed project to 
examine the 1979 shootings of five anti-racist community activists by 
Klansmen and neo-Nazis that will release its final report in May, 2006. 
A 500-page report released in 2005 was commissioned by the General 
Assembly of North Carolina to explore the overthrow by whites of the 
government of the town of Wilmington, ending black participation in 
local government until the civil rights era. The state of Florida passed a 
compensation program in 1994 for survivors of a white race riot that 
destroyed the town of Rosewood in 1923. An investigation of the Tulsa 
Race Riot of 1921 in which whites destroyed the prosperous black 
community of Greenwood published its report in 2002, recommending 
reparations for survivors and descendants; reparations have so far not 
been enacted. The state of Virginia recently matched private funds to 
provide scholarships for state residents who were unable to continue 
their education when Prince Edward County and other locales shut 
down public schools in the 1950s rather than desegregate them. 
Several cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles, have 
passed ordinances requiring disclosure of links to slavery by 
corporations receiving municipal business. Charleston, South Carolina, 
is preparing to open the Old Slave Mart Museum in an original building 
where slave auctions were held until 1863. In 2001, on the occasion of 
the university’s 300th anniversary, three doctoral candidates at Yale 
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University researched Yale’s use of slave-trade money and choices to 
honor slave-traders and defenders of slavery in the naming of its 
colleges. Ruth Simmons, Brown University’s first African-American 
president, formed a University Steering Committee on Slavery and 
Justice in 2003 to research Brown’s historical ties to slavery. 
Prosecutors have reopened notorious civil rights era murder cases in 
which indictments or convictions were impossible to secure at the 
time, in what are appropriately named “atonement trials,” while states 
have begun to consider mass or individual pardons for thousands of 
people who violated segregation laws or were convicted due to racial 
bias. 
These developments might be seen as fragmentary justice or 
alternative remedies where justice has failed. I suggest we see them 
instead as multiple, local initiatives that might be better understood 
under the rubric of restorative justice. These initiatives arise from or 
address communities and institutions, in some cases through 
government and law and in others through the effort or the leadership 
of individuals. They aim to address victims or descendants, to 
acknowledge buried or unredressed injustices, to create accountability, 
to offer gestures or repair, to respond to the needs of living victims 
and to memorialize victims who are beyond the reach of justice. Placed 
within the framework of restorative justice, these efforts are parts of a 
decentralized and incremental work of restoration and reparation that 
seems fitted to the historical length, breadth and complexity of the 
injustice in question. These actions might also build momentum toward 
the passage of Representative John Conyers’ H.R. 40 proposal for a 
national commission to examine the history and effects of slavery and 
its sequels to the present day, to explore ways to educate the 
American public and to study the question of reparations, itself a 
measure in the spirit of restorative justice, inviting public dialogue and 
seeking a fuller accounting of wrongs. 
Whether or not a national apology or reparations are achieved in 
the near or the longer term, diverse and dispersed initiatives at 
different levels are particularly fitting in a case of deeply distorted 
relations, mystifying and incomplete histories, and transgenerationally 
entrenched alienation within and between groups. A striking model for 
what is needed in such a case is provided in Manu Meyer’s discussion 
of ho’oponopono, a traditional Hawaiian peacemaking practice that 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Social Philosphy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 2006): pg. 377-395. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
20 
 
addresses troubled family relations. The practice aims at “examining 
one layer at a time, of inching toward the source of trouble to untangle 
emotion, actions, and motivations, which will, in turn, uncover yet 
another, deeper layer of the same.”38 It requires a clear view of the 
problem and a disciplined and guided work of “untangling” thoughts 
and emotions that stand between people and in the way of 
understanding and addressing the wrong or conflict. Could there really 
be a shortcut through a process like this, given centuries of distorted 
and violent racialized relations in the United States? 
I have argued that restorative justice provides a more adequate 
way to conceptualize injustice and its compounding causes and effects 
over generations in a case such as the relationship between white 
Americans and African-Americans. Restorative justice outlines a more 
varied menu of mutually supporting ways of addressing such injustice 
than does corrective justice as usually understood. My brief for the 
superiority of restorative justice as an approach to reparations in 
certain cases, however, need not be seen as completely excluding the 
relevance of corrective justice. Conceptually, corrective justice might 
be seen as a limit case of restorative justice where there has been a 
local violation of a standing norm in the context of mutually 
authoritative standards; in fact, the theory of restorative justice has 
been developed largely within a criminal justice context as a way to 
address victims’ rights to a direct and constructive response of 
accountability and repair from offenders who have harmed them in a 
particular criminal act. Practically, corrective justice and its idea of 
compensation as an expression of responsibility may well be one 
effective and familiar (and effective because familiar) concrete format 
for signifying and sealing between parties an understanding of right 
relationship, or a decisive step in the direction of such an 
understanding, that had been lacking previously. Symbolically, 
corrective justice may convey counterfactually the “restoration” of 
what should have existed but in reality did not previously obtain. This 
symbolism – of equal parties settling a debt required by their 
reciprocal recognition under shared norms – might be particularly apt 
at a certain point in cases where reparation, including 
acknowledgments of and apologies for a history of varied and gross 
mistreatment, comes very late: after a brutally oppressed, viciously 
stigmatized and persistently disadvantaged group has survived and 
struggled its way to recent formal equality, as is true of African-
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Americans. In order to perform this symbolic function, however, it will 
likely have to consolidate a more varied and complex process of 
historical accounting, acknowledgment, cultivating trust and making 
amends for which restorative justice provides the rationale.39 
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